Apr 25, 2024

Ex-Student’s Establishment Clause Claim Can Proceed As Class

Tre'Vaughn Howard
Bloomberg Law
April 22, 2024

Judge: Establishment clause claim satisfies Rule 23

But, Free Exercise claim fails for lack of typicality across class

A former Chicago public schools student, challenging implementation of a program with Hindu-influenced religious practices under the First Amendment, can proceed as a class action on her Establishment clause claim but not her Free Exercise claim, a federal judge said.

Kaya Hudgins sued Chicago’s Board of Education—among other named defendants—alleging that implementation of the “Quiet Time” program in eight CPS schools including where she attended for two years, violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the US Constitution. The program consisted of two 15-minute meditation sessions where students participated in “Transcendental Meditation” or in another quiet activity, Judge Mattew F. Kennelly, of the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, wrote.

Hudgins alleged the program was presented as non-religious, but had “‘hidden religious’ elements” because students who participated in Transcendental Meditation were assigned a Sanskrit “‘mantra’” that honored specific Hindu deities. Hudgins also alleged that students who participated were required to complete a “‘Puja’” initiation ceremony that included chants to Hindu deities inviting them to channel their powers through those in attendance. Students that opted out of participating in the meditation were still in the same classroom as those who did, Hudgins asserted.

Hudgins sought to certify a class that included all students who participated in the Quiet Program during the academic years from 2015 to 2019, and a subclass for students who participated in Quiet Time, but weren’t trained in Transcendental Meditation. CPS argued Hudgins’s claims are “overbroad,” barred the
statute of limitations, and fail to meet several requirements for certification under Rule 23.

Kennelly granted Hudgins motion in part regarding her Establishment clause claim, but denied it as to her Free Exercise claim. Citing Seventh Circuit precedent—Kennelly said CPS’s overbroad defense construes Hudgins claims “too narrowly” because students that didn’t participate in Transcendental Meditation still could have suffered harm from the alleged coercion and endorsement in violation of the Establishment clause.

Regarding the Free Exercise claim, Kennelly said adjudicating the claim would require individualized inquiries for each students’ religious beliefs. So, common questions didn’t predominate for the entire class or any variation of the subclass and, therefore, Rule 23(b)(3) wasn’t satisfied. Kennelly also amended the class definition to include students who reached age 18 on or after January 13, 2021—in order to account for an Illinois law that allows people to sue within two years of turning 18.

Kennelly disregarded CPS’s argument and exercised discretion to revise the class definition because Illinois law grants a person that was a minor when the cause of action occurred within two years of their eighteenth birthday to file a claim. And although Kennelly said Hudgins satisfied the numerosity, commonality, and typicality requirements under Rule 23 for her Establishment clause claim, Hudgins’ Free Exercise claim lacked typicality.

Specifically, Hudgins’ Free Exercise claim is not typical of the subclass since the subclass wasn’t trained in Transcendental Meditation, and would lack a representative, Kennelly said.

“Hudgins and members of the subclass do not share ‘the same essential characteristics’ with respect to their Free Exercise claims. Separating these students into the subclass Hudgins proposes does not mitigate this fundamental discrepancy,” Kennelly wrote.

Kennelly also said the four attorneys representing and Hudgins were adequate representatives, despite CPS’s citation of Hudgins’ probation status, which borders on attempted “character assassination.” The four attorneys were appointed class counsel by Kennelly.

Mauck & Baker LLC and Leahu Law Group LLC represent Hudgins and the Establishment Clause class. Pretzel & Stouffer represents Defendant David Lynch Foundation. Greenberg Traurig LLP and in-house attorneys represent the Chicago Board of Education.

The case is Hudgins v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., N.D. Ill., No. 1:23-cv-00218, 4/19/24.


https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/ex-students-establishment-clause-claim-can-proceed-as-class

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