Facebook, YouTube moves against QAnon are only a first step in the battle against dangerous conspiracy theories

Marc-André Argentino
The Conversation
October 15, 2020

Marc-André Argentino is a PhD candidate Individualized Program, 2020-2021 Public Scholar, Concordia University

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Marc-André Argentino receives funding from Concordia University. Marc-André Argentino is affiliated with the Global Network on Extremism & Technology, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, and le Centre d'expertise et de formation sur les intégrismes religieux, les idéologies politiques et la radicalisation

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Recent decisions by Facebook and YouTube to crack down on the far-right conspiracy theory movement known as QAnon will disrupt the ability of dangerous online communities to spread their radical messages, but it won’t stop them completely.

The announcement by Facebook on Oct. 6 to take down any “accounts representing QAnon, even if they contain no violent content,” followed earlier decisions by the social media platform to down-rank QAnon content in Facebook searches. YouTube followed on Oct. 15 with new rules about conspiracy videos, but it stopped short of a complete ban.

This month marks the third anniversary of the movement that started when someone known only as Q posted a series of conspiracy theories on the internet forum 4chan. Q warned of a deep state satanic ring of global elites involved in pedophilia and sex trafficking, and asserted that U.S. President Donald Trump was working on a secret plan to take them all down.

QAnon now a global phenomenon

Until this year, most people had never heard of QAnon. But over the course of 2020, the fringe movement has gained widespread traction domestically in the United States and internationally — including a number of Republican politicians who openly campaigned as Q supporters.

I have been researching QAnon for more than two years and its recent evolution has shocked even me.

What most people don’t realize is that QAnon in July and August was a different movement than what QAnon has become in October. I have never seen a movement evolve or radicalize as fast as QAnon — and it’s happening at a time when the socio-political environment globally is much different now than it was in the summer.

All of these factors came into play when Facebook decided to take action against “militarized social movements and QAnon.”

In the weeks leading up to the ban, I had seen a trend in more violent content on Facebook, especially with the circulation of memes and videos promoting “vehicle ramming attacks” with the slogan “all lives splatter” and other racist messages against Black people.

In explaining its ban, Facebook noted while it had “removed QAnon content that celebrates and supports violence, we’ve seen other QAnon content tied to different forms of real world harm, including recent claims that the (U.S.) West Coast wildfires were started by certain groups, which diverted attention of local officials from fighting the fires and protecting the public.”

Prior action was ineffective

Prior to the outright ban, Facebook’s earlier attempts to disrupt QAnon groups from organizing on Facebook and Instagram were not enough to stop its fake messages from spreading.

One way Q supporters adapted was through lighter forms of propaganda — something I call Pastel QAnon. As a way to circumvent the initial Facebook sanctions, women who believe in the QAnon conspiracies were using warm and colourful images to spread QAnon theories through health and wellness communities and by infiltrating legitimate charitable campaigns against child trafficking.

The latest move by Facebook will still allow Pastel QAnon to exist in adjacent lifestyle, health and fitness communities — a softening of the traditionally raw QAnon narratives, but an effective way to spread the conspiracies to new audiences.
Some QAnon pages have survived ban

Facebook will certainly be monitoring any attempts by the QAnon community to circumvent the ban. And while Facebook’s action reduced the number of QAnon accounts, it didn’t eliminate them completely — and realistically will not. My research shows the following:

• QAnon public groups pre-ban 186; post-ban 18.
• QAnon public pages pre-ban 253; post-ban 66.
• Instagram accounts pre-ban 269; post-ban 111.

Facebook’s actions will do permanent damage to the presence of QAnon on the platform in the long run. Short and medium term, what we will see are pages and groups reforming and trying to game the Facebook algorithm to see if they can avoid detection.

However, with little presence on Facebook to quickly amplify new pages and groups and the changes to the search algorithm, this will not be as effective as it was in the past.

Where will QAnon followers turn if Facebook is no longer the most effective way to spread its theories? Already, QAnon has further fragmented into communities on Telegram, Parler, MeWe and Gab. These alternative social media platforms are not as effective for promoting content or merchandise, which will impact grifters who were profiting from QAnon, as well as limit the reach of proselytizers.

But the ban will push those already convinced by QAnon onto platforms where they will interact with more extreme content they may not have found on Facebook. This will radicalize some individuals more than they already are or will accelerate the process for others who may have already been on this path.
Like a religious movement

What we will likely see eventually is the balkanisation of the QAnon ideology. It will be important to start considering that QAnon is more than a conspiracy theory, but closer to a new religious movement. It will also be important to consider how QAnon has be able to absorb, co-opt or adapt itself to other ideologies.

Though Facebook has taken this important step, there will be much work ahead to make sure QAnon doesn’t reappear on the platform.

YouTube said its new rules for “managing harmful conspiracy theories” are intended to “curb hate and harassment by removing more conspiracy theory content used to justify real-world violence.”

In the initial wave of takedowns, YouTube shut down the channels of some of the QAnon influencers and proselytizers, in particular Canadian QAnon influencer Amazing Polly and Québec QAnon influencer Alexis Cossette-Trudel. Though this will cut off some of the big influencers, there is more QAnon content on YouTube that falls outside the platform’s new rules.

The new rules will not stop the role YouTube plays in radicalizing individuals into QAnon, nor will it curb those who will radicalize to violence until the platform bans all QAnon content.

Video is the most used medium to circulate QAnon content across digital ecosystems. As long as QAnon still has a home on YouTube, we will continue to see their content on all social media platforms. QAnon will ultimately require a multi-platform effort.

Technology and platforms provide a vector for extremist movements like QAnon. However, at its root, it’s a human issue and the current socio-political environment around the world is fertile for the continued existence and growth of QAnon.

The action by Facebook and YouTube is a step in the right direction, but this is not the end game. There is much work ahead for those working in this space.

https://theconversation.com/facebook-youtube-moves-against-qanon-are-only-a-first-step-in-the-battle-against-dangerous-conspiracy-theories-147883

My son, Osama: The al-Qaida leader's mother speaks for the first time

Nearly 17 years since 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s family remains an influential part of Saudi society – as well as a reminder of the darkest moment in the kingdom’s history. Can they escape his legacy?

Martin ChulovThe Guardian
August 3, 2018

the corner couch of a spacious room, a woman wearing a brightly patterned robe sits expectantly. The red hijab that covers her hair is reflected in a glass-fronted cabinet; inside, a framed photograph of her firstborn son takes pride of place between family heirlooms and valuables. A smiling, bearded figure wearing a military jacket, he features in photographs around the room: propped against the wall at her feet, resting on a mantlepiece. A supper of Saudi meze and a lemon cheesecake has been spread out on a large wooden dining table.

Alia Ghanem is Osama bin Laden’s mother, and she commands the attention of everyone in the room. On chairs nearby sit two of her surviving sons, Ahmad and Hassan, and her second husband, Mohammed al-Attas, the man who raised all three brothers. Everyone in the family has their own story to tell about the man linked to the rise of global terrorism; but it is Ghanem who holds court today, describing a man who is, to her, still a beloved son who somehow lost his way. “My life was very difficult because he was so far away from me,” she says, speaking confidently. “He was a very good kid and he loved me so much.” Now in her mid-70s and in variable health, Ghanem points at al-Attas – a lean, fit man dressed, like his two sons, in an immaculately pressed white thobe, a gown worn by men across the Arabian peninsula. “He raised Osama from the age of three. He was a good man, and he was good to Osama.”

The family have gathered in a corner of the mansion they now share in Jeddah, the Saudi Arabian city that has been home to the Bin Laden clan for generations. They remain one of the kingdom’s wealthiest families: their dynastic construction empire built much of modern Saudi Arabia, and is deeply woven into the country’s establishment. The Bin Laden home reflects their fortune and influence, a large spiral staircase at its centre leading to cavernous rooms. Ramadan has come and gone, and the bowls of dates and chocolates that mark the three-day festival that follows it sit on tabletops throughout the house. Large manors line the rest of the street; this is well-to-do Jeddah, and while no guard stands watch outside, the Bin Ladens are the neighbourhood’s best-known residents.

For years, Ghanem has refused to talk about Osama, as has his wider family – throughout his two-decade reign as al-Qaida leader, a period that saw the strikes on New York and Washington DC, and ended more than nine years later with his death in Pakistan.

Now, Saudi Arabia’s new leadership – spearheaded by the ambitious 32-year-old heir to the throne, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman – has agreed to my request to speak to the family. (As one of the country’s most influential families, their movements and engagements remain closely monitored.) Osama’s legacy is as grave a blight on the kingdom as it is on his family, and senior officials believe that, by allowing the Bin Ladens to tell their story, they can demonstrate that an outcast – not an agent – was responsible for 9/11. Saudi Arabia’s critics have long alleged that Osama had state support, and the families of a number of 9/11 victims have launched (so far unsuccessful) legal actions against the kingdom. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia.

Unsurprisingly, Osama bin Laden’s family are cautious in our initial negotiations; they are not sure whether opening old wounds will prove cathartic or harmful. But after several days of discussion, they are willing to talk. When we meet on a hot day in early June, a minder from the Saudi government sits in the room, though she makes no attempt to influence the conversation. (We are also joined by a translator.)

Sitting between Osama’s half-brothers, Ghanem recalls her firstborn as a shy boy who was academically capable. He became a strong, driven, pious figure in his early 20s, she says, while studying economics at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, where he was also radicalised. “The people at university changed him,” Ghanem says. “He became a different man.” One of the men he met there was Abdullah Azzam, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was later exiled from Saudi Arabia and became Osama’s spiritual adviser. “He was a very good child until he met some people who pretty much brainwashed him in his early 20s. You can call it a cult. They got money for their cause. I would always tell him to stay away from them, and he would never admit to me what he was doing, because he loved me so much.”

In the early 1980s, Osama travelled to Afghanistan to fight the Russian occupation. “Everyone who met him in the early days respected him,” says Hassan, picking up the story. “At the start, we were very proud of him. Even the Saudi government would treat him in a very noble, respectful way. And then came Osama the mujahid.”

A long uncomfortable silence follows, as Hassan struggles to explain the transformation from zealot to global jihadist. “I am very proud of him in the sense that he was my oldest brother,” he eventually continues. “He taught me a lot. But I don’t think I’m very proud of him as a man. He reached superstardom on a global stage, and it was all for nothing.”

Ghanem listens intently, becoming more animated when the conversation returns to Osama’s formative years. “He was very straight. Very good at school. He really liked to study. He spent all his money on Afghanistan – he would sneak off under the guise of family business.” Did she ever suspect he might become a jihadist? “It never crossed my mind.” How did it feel when she realised he had? “We were extremely upset. I did not want any of this to happen. Why would he throw it all away like that?”

The family say they last saw Osama in Afghanistan in 1999, a year in which they visited him twice at his base just outside Kandahar. “It was a place near the airport that they had captured from the Russians,” Ghanem says. “He was very happy to receive us. He was showing us around every day we were there. He killed an animal and we had a feast, and he invited everyone.”

Ghanem begins to relax, and talks about her childhood in the coastal Syrian city of Latakia, where she grew up in a family of Alawites, an offshoot of Shia Islam. Syrian cuisine is superior to Saudi, she says, and so is the weather by the Mediterranean, where the warm, wet summer air was a stark contrast to the acetylene heat of Jeddah in June. Ghanem moved to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1950s, and Osama was born in Riyadh in 1957. She divorced his father three years later, and married al-Attas, then an administrator in the fledgling Bin Laden empire, in the early 1960s. Osama’s father went on to have 54 children with at least 11 wives.

When Ghanem leaves to rest in a nearby room, Osama’s half-brothers continue the conversation. It’s important, they say, to remember that a mother is rarely an objective witness. “It has been 17 years now [since 9/11] and she remains in denial about Osama,” Ahmad says. “She loved him so much and refuses to blame him. Instead, she blames those around him. She only knows the good boy side, the side we all saw. She never got to know the jihadist side.

“I was shocked, stunned,” he says now of the early reports from New York. “It was a very strange feeling. We knew from the beginning [that it was Osama], within the first 48 hours. From the youngest to the eldest, we all felt ashamed of him. We knew all of us were going to face horrible consequences. Our family abroad all came back to Saudi.” They had been scattered across Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Europe. “In Saudi, there was a travel ban. They tried as much as they could to maintain control over the family.” The family say they were all questioned by the authorities and, for a time, prevented from leaving the country. Nearly two decades on, the Bin Ladens can move relatively freely within and outside the kingdom.






Osama bin Laden’s formative years in Jeddah came in the relatively freewheeling 1970s, before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which aimed to export Shia zeal into the Sunni Arab world. From then on, Saudi’s rulers enforced a rigid interpretation of Sunni Islam – one that had been widely practised across the Arabian peninsula since the 18th century, the era of cleric Muhammed ibn Abdul Wahhab. In 1744, Abdul Wahhab had made a pact with the then ruler Mohammed bin Saud, allowing his family to run affairs of state while hardline clerics defined the national character.

The modern day kingdom, proclaimed in 1932, left both sides – the clerics and the rulers – too powerful to take the other on, locking the state and its citizens into a society defined by arch-conservative views: the strict segregation of non-related men and women; uncompromising gender roles; an intolerance of other faiths; and an unfailing adherence to doctrinal teachings, all rubber-stamped by the House of Saud.

Many believe this alliance directly contributed to the rise of global terrorism. Al-Qaida’s worldview – and that of its offshoot, Islamic State (Isis) – were largely shaped by Wahhabi scriptures; and Saudi clerics were widely accused of encouraging a jihadist movement that grew throughout the 1990s, with Osama bin Laden at its centre.

In 2018, Saudi’s new leadership wants to draw a line under this era and introduce what bin Salman calls “moderate Islam”. This he sees as essential to the survival of a state where a large, restless and often disaffected young population has, for nearly four decades, had little access to entertainment, a social life or individual freedoms. Saudi’s new rulers believe such rigid societal norms, enforced by clerics, could prove fodder for extremists who tap into such feelings of frustration.

Reform is beginning to creep through many aspects of Saudi society; among the most visible was June’s lifting of the ban on women drivers. There have been changes to the labour markets and a bloated public sector; cinemas have opened, and an anti-corruption drive launched across the private sector and some quarters of government. The government also claims to have stopped all funding to Wahhabi institutions outside the kingdom, which had been supported with missionary zeal for nearly four decades.

Such radical shock therapy is slowly being absorbed across the country, where communities conditioned to decades of uncompromising doctrine don’t always know what to make of it. Contradictions abound: some officials and institutions eschew conservatism, while others wholeheartedly embrace it. Meanwhile, political freedoms remain off-limits; power has become more centralised and dissent is routinely crushed.






Bin Laden’s legacy remains one of the kingdom’s most pressing issues. I meet Prince Turki al-Faisal, who was the head of Saudi intelligence for 24 years, between 1977 and 1 September 2001 (10 days before the 9/11 attacks), at his villa in Jeddah. An erudite man now in his mid-70s, Turki wears green cufflinks bearing the Saudi flag on the sleeves of his thobe. “There are two Osama bin Ladens,” he tells me. “One before the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and one after it. Before, he was very much an idealistic mujahid. He was not a fighter. By his own admission, he fainted during a battle, and when he woke up, the Soviet assault on his position had been defeated.”

As Bin Laden moved from Afghanistan to Sudan, and as his links to Saudi Arabia soured, it was Turki who spoke with him on behalf of the kingdom. In the wake of 9/11, these direct dealings came under intense scrutiny. Then – and 17 years later – relatives of some of the 2,976 killed and more than 6,000 wounded in New York and Washington DC refuse to believe that a country that had exported such an arch-conservative form of the faith could have nothing to do with the consequences.

Certainly, Bin Laden travelled to Afghanistan with the knowledge and backing of the Saudi state, which opposed the Soviet occupation; along with America, the Saudis armed and supported those groups who fought it. The young mujahid had taken a small part of the family fortune with him, which he used to buy influence. When he returned to Jeddah, emboldened by battle and the Soviet defeat, he was a different man, Turki says. “He developed a more political attitude from 1990. He wanted to evict the communists and South Yemeni Marxists from Yemen. I received him, and told him it was better that he did not get involved. The mosques of Jeddah were using the Afghan example.” By this, Turki means the narrowly defined reading of the faith espoused by the Taliban. “He was inciting them [Saudi worshippers]. He was told to stop.”

“He had a poker face,” Turki continues. “He never grimaced, or smiled. In 1992, 1993, there was a huge meeting in Peshawar organised by Nawaz Sharif’s government.” Bin Laden had by this point been given refuge by Afghan tribal leaders. “There was a call for Muslim solidarity, to coerce those leaders of the Muslim world to stop going at each other’s throats. I also saw him there. Our eyes met, but we didn’t talk. He didn’t go back to the kingdom. He went to Sudan, where he built a honey business and financed a road.”

Bin Laden’s advocacy increased in exile. “He used to fax statements to everybody. He was very critical. There were efforts by the family to dissuade him – emissaries and such – but they were unsuccessful. It was probably his feeling that he was not taken seriously by the government.”

By 1996, Bin Laden was back in Afghanistan. Turki says the kingdom knew it had a problem and wanted him returned. He flew to Kandahar to meet with the then head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar. “He said, ‘I am not averse to handing him over, but he was very helpful to the Afghan people.’ He said Bin Laden was granted refuge according to Islamic dictates.” Two years later, in September 1998, Turki flew again to Afghanistan, this time to be robustly rebuffed. “At that meeting, he was a changed man,” he says of Omar. “Much more reserved, sweating profusely. Instead of taking a reasonable tone, he said, ‘How can you persecute this worthy man who dedicated his life to helping Muslims?’” Turki says he warned Omar that what he was doing would harm the people of Afghanistan, and left.

The family visit to Kandahar took place the following year, and came after a US missile strike on one of Bin Laden’s compounds – a response to al-Qaida attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. It seems an entourage of immediate family had little trouble finding their man, where the Saudi and western intelligence networks could not.

According to officials in Riyadh, London and Washington DC, Bin Laden had by then become the world’s number one counter-terrorism target, a man who was bent on using Saudi citizens to drive a wedge between eastern and western civilisations. “There is no doubt that he deliberately chose Saudi citizens for the 9/11 plot,” a British intelligence officer tells me. “He was convinced that was going to turn the west against his ... home country. He did indeed succeed in inciting a war, but not the one he expected.”

Turki claims that in the months before 9/11, his intelligence agency knew that something troubling was being planned. “In the summer of 2001, I took one of the warnings about something spectacular about to happen to the Americans, British, French and Arabs. We didn’t know where, but we knew that something was being brewed.”

Bin Laden remains a popular figure in some parts of the country, lauded by those who believe he did God’s work. The depth of support, however, is difficult to gauge. What remains of his immediate family, meanwhile, has been allowed back into the kingdom: at least two of Osama’s wives (one of whom was with him in Abbottabad when he was killed by US special forces) and their children now live in Jeddah.

“We had a very good relationship with Mohammed bin Nayef [the former crown prince],” Osama’s half-brother Ahmad tells me as a maid sets the nearby dinner table. “He let the wives and children return.” But while they have freedom of movement inside the city, they cannot leave the kingdom.

Osama’s mother rejoins the conversation. “I speak to his harem most weeks,” she says. “They live nearby.”

Osama’s half-sister, and the two men’s sister, Fatima al-Attas, was not at our meeting. From her home in Paris, she later emailed to say she strongly objected to her mother being interviewed, asking that it be rearranged through her. Despite the blessing of her brothers and stepfather, she felt her mother had been pressured into talking. Ghanem, however, insisted she was happy to talk and could have talked longer. It is, perhaps, a sign of the extended family’s complicated status in the kingdom that such tensions exist.

I ask the family about Bin Laden’s youngest son, 29-year-old Hamza, who is thought to be in Afghanistan. Last year, he was officially designated a “global terrorist” by the US and appears to have taken up the mantle of his father, under the auspices of al-Qaida’s new leader, and Osama’s former deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

His uncles shake their heads. “We thought everyone was over this,” Hassan says. “Then the next thing I knew, Hamza was saying, ‘I am going to avenge my father.’ I don’t want to go through that again. If Hamza was in front of me now, I would tell him, ‘God guide you. Think twice about what you are doing. Don’t retake the steps of your father. You are entering horrible parts of your soul.’”

Hamza bin Laden’s continued rise may well cloud the family’s attempts to shake off their past. It may also hinder the crown prince’s efforts to shape a new era in which Bin Laden is cast as a generational aberration, and in which the hardline doctrines once sanctioned by the kingdom no longer offer legitimacy to extremism. While change has been attempted in Saudi Arabia before, it has been nowhere near as extensive as the current reforms. How hard Mohammed bin Salman can push against a society indoctrinated in such an uncompromising worldview remains an open question.

Saudia Arabia’s allies are optimistic, but offer a note of caution. The British intelligence officer I spoke to told me, “If Salman doesn’t break through, there will be many more Osamas. And I’m not sure they’ll be able to shake the curse.”

Translation by Nadia al-Faour

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/osama-bin-laden-mother-speaks-out-family-interview

When is a Religion 'Extremist'?

Tim Rymel, M.Ed.
Huffington Post
May 6, 2017

In April, Russia’s Supreme Court labeled Jehovah’s Witnesses an extremist religious group. “It effectively means that holding their beliefs and manifesting them is tantamount to a criminal act in Russia. They risk new levels of persecution by the Russian authorities,” said international legal counsel, Lorcan Price.

In America, most of us think of Jehovah’s Witnesses as that occasional Saturday nuisance. They interrupt our morning breakfast or afternoon chores to tell us their version of the Christian faith. They cheerfully drag their families along for quiet strolls through the neighborhoods, and pass out Watchtower Magazines for us to throw away later.

Annoying? Yes. Disruptive? Usually. But extremist? That depends.

Growing up in the Pentecostal faith, I was taught that Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and Catholics were not Christians. Anyone who converted to those, or other non-mainstream Christian sects, was deceived by the devil. Though we didn’t use the word “extremist” to define those religions, we certainly saw them as a threat to the true people of God who were susceptible to “false teachings.”

Religion, to paraphrase Merriam-Webster, is generally a belief in the supernatural with a commitment to keep up the attitudes and practices surrounding that belief. In other words, religion is more than just a belief it is an action. For some, that means attending church on Sundays. For others, it means killing people for believing the wrong things, or believing in the wrong way.

The BBC noted that Al Qaeda’s purpose is to avenge “wrongs committed by Christians against Muslims.” The organization wants to implement a “single Islamic political leadership,” and drive away non-Muslims from areas it deems belong to the nation of Islam.

ISIS, on the other hand, is a group of Scriptural fundamentalists who believe all other Muslims are apostates. William McCants, director of the Project on US Relations With the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution, says that ISIS wants “to restore the early Islamic empire called the caliphate and eventually take over the whole world.”

Most of us can agree that Al Qaeda and ISIS are extremist groups. After all, they plan and implement terrorist attacks. They kill people, sometimes brutally. But is violence the only indicator of religious extremism?

It could certainly be argued that when a religion becomes violent it becomes extremist. But even Christianity, in it’s many definitions, has a sorted history, which is seldom talked about and often dismissed. From the Spanish inquisition to the convert-or-die tactics used on Native American Indians, Christianity has been used to commit horrific acts of violence throughout the centuries. Judaism, from which Christianity arose, recorded shocking details in the Torah of the slaughter of entire populations, including women, children, and animals.

Any religion, which purports to, alone, have all truth, and to, alone, have a direct line of communication to God, has a propensity toward extremist ideology. As University of Notre Dame Professor, Gary Gutting, points out:

The potential for intolerance lies in the logic of religions like Christianity and Islam that say their teaching derive from a divine revelation. For them, the truth that God has revealed is the most important truth there is; therefore, denying or doubting this truth is extremely dangerous, both for nonbelievers, who lack this essential truth, and for believers, who may well be misled by the denials and doubts of nonbelievers.

Any religion that denies the value and humanity of others is an extremist religion. Whether those actions lead to direct harm, or simply reduce protections through legislation, extremist ideology seeks to create one class that is believed to be more valued than another.

The grandstanding that fundamentalist Christians have done since marriage equality passed in 2015 has created a growing, and disturbing trend toward extremist Christianity.

The Oath Keepers, a vigilante Christian group, vowed to protect Kentucky County Clerk, Kim Davis, when she refused issuing a marriage license to a gay couple. They stated the judge in Davis’ case “needs to be put on notice that his behavior is not going to be accepted and we’ll be there to stop it and intercede ourselves if we have to.” And then, in an ironic twist to the story, the infamous Westboro Baptist Church, of “God hates fags” fame, picketed Kim Davis because of her multiple divorces and remarriages.

Since then, dozens of “religious freedom” bills have been introduced across the country with the sole purpose of reducing or eliminating protections for the LGBT community in housing, employment, benefits, and even where they can go to the bathroom.

The problem, of course, is that “religious freedom” is based on nothing more than a belief. Governments who support “religious freedom” over the equal human rights and dignity of others condone, and even endorse discrimination. In any such environment religious extremism is the outcome, threatening the very existence of democracy.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/when-is-a-religion-extremist_us_590de8e3e4b046ea176aeb98

Opinion Don’t imprison ISIS kids, deprogram them

Judit Neurink

Judit Neurink
Rudaw
February 23, 2017

Opinion

Now that the battle of Mosul is gearing up again, western states are alarmed about children who might return home from ISIS territory, or will be sent to commit suicide attacks in the West.

During the years of ISIS’ rule, many local people in Iraq and Syria were indoctrinated into following the group and fighting their battle.

Amongst them are many young boys who were schooled into the ISIS brand of Islam, and trained in gun use and warfare, from as young as six years old.

The problems these Cubs of the Caliphate will cause, has been discussed before, but now that mounting losses and desperation are forcing ISIS to actually use them, the issue needs all our attention.

Some of the boys are Yezidis, who were captured when ISIS took over their towns and villages in the Sinjar province over two years ago, and were then put through ISIS’ indoctrination program.

Boys who had managed to escape told me how they daily would have to watch videos of executions, were trained to wear a suicide belt, and how some of their former friends seemed to have adopted their captor’s religion and behavior with vigor.

Recently, ISIS posted photos and videos of two Yezidi teenagers on their way to commit their suicide attacks, talking between them how ‘they left the darkness of their faith for the light of Islam’.

They showed the extent of their indoctrination, repeating slogans, boasting how they had made the right choices.

We don’t know if they did actually commit the attacks, but it is clear that of all suicide bombers the group uses, at least a third (and probably more) are under eighteen.

Videos of foreign ISIS fighters instructing their own children to get ready for the jihad, have shown us the danger these youths may pose too, as they have never learned anything but the ISIS doctrine.

But local kids also pose a threat to their communities, having been sent to the ISIS schools and training camps, been prepared for the battle and promised the paradise.

What to do with them; how to prevent them from obliging their peers in ISIS?

Indoctrination needs to be fought through deprogramming, and not by imprisoning; just remember how Al Qaida was able to recruit and grow inside the prisons where its members were kept, and not in the least in those of the Americans in Iraq.

Yet some teenagers who were with ISIS are now being held together in a youth prison in Duhok — as far as I know without being subject to any de-radicalization program.

What we need is creativity, and humanity.

A policeman who recently returned to work in Mosul, told me how he and his colleagues decided to take care of a fifteen-year-old he had to question about his ties to ISIS.

He kept the boy with him, and spoke with him a couple of hours daily about the kid’s convictions and ideas for his future life.

The boy was allowed to go home, on the condition he would go to school and show good results, and would report back regularly to the police office.

This police team was doing something extra-ordinary, out of caring for a boy that they knew would only turn more radical in jail.

They tried to give him a chance to change back into a normal boy who would be able to live with his family in his community – even though they knew the chances were slim, they preferred it to sending him to jail.

We know that that many more teenage boys will be found and captured, and that there is no policeman like my friend for every one of them.

Even though the dilemma was clear, we are not prepared: there are no special institutions in Iraq to attempt to cure their radical views.

De-radicalisation is not an easy concept, as was seen for instance in Saudi Arabia, where a special program for Al Qaida convicts showed that some of the recipients of the de-radicalisation were still to end up in the top of Al Qaida.

In the West, some countries have developed programs to try and win back the minds and souls of those indoctrinated by radicals and sects.

What makes it extra hard is that those who are indoctrinated, usually are not interested in life, as they have already lost it, as experts have told me.

The fact that they deem their lives so painful and worthless that they do not want to continue makes them extremely dangerous, for they can be used as robots to kill, as long as they get killed themselves too.

If putting them in jail is dangerous and leaving them out is also, there is only one possibility left for boys involved, even if that is not fool-proof either.

Give these kids a chance and treat them for what they are: kids that have been pressed into believing something that is killing them, and who need help to deprogram their brains into wanting to live again.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
 
http://www.rudaw.net/NewsDetails.aspx?pageid=284762

Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, linked to 1993 World Trade Center attack, has died

February 18, 2017
FoxNews.com

Reuters: Terrorist behind 1993 WTC bombing dies in prison

Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the blind firebrand Islamist cleric behind the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, has died in federal prison, Fox News has learned. He was 78.

Abdel-Rahman, an Egyptian radical who maintained a global following even while imprisoned for more than two decades, died Saturday morning at Butner Federal Medical Center in North Carolina, where he was serving a life sentence.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons confirmed that Abdel-Rahman died at approximately 5:40 a.m. Saturday of natural causes after a long health battle with diabetes and coronary artery disease.

His son Ammar told Reuters that his family had received a phone call from a U.S. representative saying his father had died.

Andrew McCarthy, who was the assistant US attorney who prosecuted Abdel-Rahman for the federal government, told Fox News on Saturday that the sheikh was globally notorious as the “emir of jihad” long before there was an al-Qaeda or ISIS.

"He provided the international jihadist campaign its deep roots in sharia supremacism," McCarthy added.

"His scholarly heft made him highly influential, in the deadliest of ways. The only thing he could do was lead [the terrorist organization]— provide it with inspiration and a sense of diving mission. His life is a testament to the centrality of sharia supremacist ideology to the terrorist threat."

Abdel-Rahman was convicted in 1995 of plotting terror attacks throughout New York City, targeting the United Nations and other New York City landmarks. He was also linked to the 1993 World Trade Center attack in which six people died and more than 1,000 others were injured.

Known as “The Blind Sheikh,” Abdel-Rahman lost his eyesight when he was 10 months old. By the time he was 11 years old, he had memorized the Braille version of the Qur’an and was sent to an Islamic boarding school.

He went on to study at Cairo University’s School of Theology and later earned a doctorate in from Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Abdel-Rahman went on to become one of the country’s most prominent and outspoken Muslim clerics to denounce Egypt’s secularism.

In the mid-1980s, Abdel-Rahman made his way to Afghanistan, where he built a strong rapport with former Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Bin Laden once credited Abdel-Rahman as the inspiration and justification for the September 11 attacks which destroyed the World Trade Center.

Adbel-Rahman was the spiritual leader of Al-Gama Al-Islamiyya. The Islamic group was believed to have been behind other terror attacks such as the 1997 killing of tourists in Luxor, Egypt.

He remains revered in his native Egypt, and his supporters had demonstrated throughout Cairo for his freedom in the past.

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/02/18/sheikh-omar-abdel-rahman-linked-to-1993-world-trade-center-attack-has-died.html

The Hypnotic Power of ISIS Imagery in Recruiting Western Youth

ICSVE
Anne Speckhard, Ph.D.
October 20, 2015

 

Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. : is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown University in the School of Medicine and of Security Studies in the School of Foreign Service. She is Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism and a nonresident Fellow of Trends. She is also the author of Talking to Terrorists and coauthor of Undercover Jihadi. Her newly released book, inspired by the true story of an American girl seduced over the Internet into ISIS is Bride of ISIS. Dr. Speckhard has interviewed over four hundred terrorists, their family members and supporters in various parts of the world including Gaza, the West Bank, Chechnya, Iraq, Jordan and many countries in Europe. She was responsible for designing the psychological and Islamic challenge aspects of the Detainee Rehabilitation Program in Iraq to be applied to twenty thousand detainees and eight hundred juveniles. Website: www.AnneSpeckhard.com

A picture is worth a thousand words. It’s a commonly accepted piece of wisdom—one that groups like al Qaeda and ISIS understand all too well when trying to recruit Western youth into their ranks. Images often speak directly to our right brains, activating the limbic system, and potentially bypassing rational thought. This results in statements that are subtly, or overtly embedded, alongside emotionally evocative images, highly suggestive—if not downright hypnotic.

Both al Qaeda and ISIS have built their terrorist narrative upon hijacked verses from sacred scriptures of the Quran and hadiths arguing that militant jihad is a duty incumbent on all Muslims. After declaring its Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, ISIS declared even more strongly than ever before, that hijrah—or moving to the battleground—is also incumbent on all Muslims, and for those Westerners who cannot come, one is enjoined to “stay and attack” at home. This was an argument put forward in English years earlier, prior to ISIS even being formed, by Anwar al-Awlaki (of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula).[1] Although al-Awlaki was killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2011, he continues to inspire from beyond the grave—enjoying eternal life over the Internet via his preserved sermons of hatred for the West.
Al Qaeda argued early on, and ISIS has taken up the same line of reasoning, that the worldwide Islamic jihad is a defensive one, a line of argument that is made by showing graphic images and video from conflict zones to demonstrate undisputed tragedy. The West in militant jihadi propaganda, is held responsible for propping up tyrannical dictators, states; and in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, even overtly invading Muslim lands, hurting Muslim people, and attacking Islam itself. As a result, these groups call for so-called “defensive” jihad.

In its propaganda, ISIS defends its savagery and bloodshed as a necessary evil. Its leaders and ideologues argue that building the Caliphate involves a worldwide revolution to bring in a new utopian system to rule according to Islamic ideals and that all revolutions require blood to be spilled. Abu Baker al-Baghdadi, seeming to understand that gruesome savagery was not perhaps the best marketing tool, did however, recently order that graphically violent images and videos of the group’s atrocities no longer be posted, in favor of videos that demonstrate successes of the Islamic State in building a new, peaceful, and well-running society. [2]
While one would hope that Westerners would be capable of critical thinking and not easily succumb to the visual propaganda of groups like ISIS, we know that other enterprises such as business like Coca Cola (Share a Coke) and Nike (Just Do It), and humanitarian missions like World Vision (starving child surrounded by flies) also successfully use imagery coupled with catchy slogans in much the same way—to bypass critical thinking and engage emotions to gain a sale, or in the case of humanitarian organizations, a donation.

ISIS is no different in that regard. An examination of the propaganda imagery found in Internet posters, videos, and media campaigns demonstrates the same use of images and emotional appeals as that used so successfully in Western advertising. The following is an analysis of some of their emotional and visual appeals of materials produced by al Hayat Media Center, the media arm of ISIS, and Rayat al Tawheed, a group of British foreign fighters representing ISIS.

Belonging

Fuman beings are a social species. Relatedness and belonging in youth to one’s parent, if not larger family, determines our survival and ability to thrive. In adulthood belonging to groups often greatly influences our level of psychological, economic and social wellbeing.

Read complete report (PDF)

http://www.icsve.org/the-hypnotic-power-of-isis-imagery-in-recruiting-western-youth.html

Hollywood film director's British son is the new face of al Qaeda in Syria

Ashitha Nagesh
Metro.co.uk
October 19, 2015

Lucas Kinney, 26, has been appearing in extremist propaganda videos for the affiliated group Jabhat al Nusra, encouraging potential recruits to sign up.

His dad Patrick Kinney, 59, was assistant director on Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, Braveheart, and Rambo: First Blood Part II, according to IMDb.

Lucas is the first white British convert to turn up in Syria.

He grew up in a Catholic household, attended Catholic primary and secondary schools, and even spoke about becoming a Catholic priest when he was a teenager.

As a young adult, he was also in a band called Hannah’s Got Herpes.

So his religious conversion, and later radicalisation, came as a shock to his family.

‘Lucas is a target. I’m glad he’s associated with al Qaeda rather than Isis, but obviously I worry,’ his mum Deborah Phipps, 53, told Mail Online.

‘He’s married out there. I don’t know anything about her. They don’t have any children as far as I know, but this is recent, the last few months.

‘We just want him to come home. If he’s done something wrong I’d like him to accept the consequences. He’s still young – and at least he’s still alive.’

Lucas went to Leeds University but dropped out after a year, and went to live with his dad in Vienna. It was there that he’s believed to have been radicalised.

He’s now featured in two propaganda videos under the nom de guerre Abu Basir al Britani.

In one of the videos, his green and white toothbrush can be seen tucked into his military webbing.

This prompted viewers to joke: ‘Don’t forget your toothbrush.’

http://metro.co.uk/2015/10/19/this-is-the-new-face-of-al-qaeda-in-syria-a-hollywood-directors-british-son-5447859/

How to Defeat Religious Violence

Wall Street Journal
JONATHAN SACKS
October 2, 2015

The West was caught unprepared by the rise of Islamic State, as it was a decade and a half ago by the attacks of al Qaeda and as the Soviet Union was by the determination of the mujahedeen of Afghanistan in the 1980s. These are among the worst failures of political intelligence in modern times, and the consequences have been disastrous.

The unpreparedness was not accidental. It happened because of a blind spot in the secular mind: the inability to see the elemental, world-shaking power of religion when hijacked by politics. Ever since the rise of modern science, intellectuals have been convinced that faith is in intensive care, about to die or at least rendered harmless by exclusion from the public square.

But not all regions of the world have gone through this process. Not all religions have allowed themselves to be excluded from the public square. And when secular revolutions fail, we should know by now that we can expect religious counterrevolutions.

Religion has lately demanded our attention not as a still, small voice but as a whirlwind. If Isaiah’s prophecy that nations “shall beat their swords into plowshares” is to be fulfilled, then the essential task now is to think through the connection between religion and violence.

Three answers have emerged in recent years. The first: Religion is the major source of violence. Therefore, if we seek a more peaceful world, we should abolish religion. The second: Religion is not a source of violence. It may be used by manipulative leaders to motivate people to wage wars precisely because it inspires people to heroic acts of self-sacrifice, but religion itself teaches us to love and forgive, not to hate and fight. The third: Their religion, yes; our religion, no. We are for peace. They are for war.

None of these is true. As for the first, Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod surveyed 1,800 conflicts for their “Encyclopedia of Wars” and found that less than 10% involved religion. A “God and War” audit commissioned by the BBC found that religion played some part in 40% of major wars over the past three millennia, but usually a minor one.

The second answer is misguided. When terrorist or military groups invoke holy war, define their battle as a struggle against Satan, condemn unbelievers to death and commit murder while declaring that “God is great,” it is absurd to deny that they are acting on religious motives. Religions seek peace, but on their own terms.

The third is a classic instance of in-group bias. Groups, like individuals, have a need for self-esteem, and they will interpret facts to confirm their sense of superiority. Judaism, Christianity and Islam define themselves as religions of peace, yet they have all initiated violence at some points in their history.

My concern here is less the general connection between religion and violence than the specific challenge of politicized religious extremism in the 21st century. The re-emergence of religion as a global force caught the West unprotected and unprepared because it was in the grip of a narrative that told a quite different story.

It is said that 1989, the year of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, marked the final act of an extended drama in which first religion, then political ideology, died after a prolonged period in intensive care. The age of the true believer, religious or secular, was over. In its place had come the market economy and the liberal democratic state, in which individuals and their right to live as they chose took priority over all creeds and codes. It was the last chapter of a story that began in the 17th century, the last great age of wars of religion.

What the secularists forgot is that Homo sapiens is the meaning-seeking animal. If there is one thing the great institutions of the modern world do not do, it is to provide meaning. Science tells us how but not why. Technology gives us power but cannot guide us as to how to use that power. The market gives us choices but leaves us uninstructed as to how to make those choices. The liberal democratic state gives us freedom to live as we choose but refuses, on principle, to guide us as to how to choose.

Science, technology, the free market and the liberal democratic state have enabled us to reach unprecedented achievements in knowledge, freedom, life expectancy and affluence. They are among the greatest achievements of human civilization and are to be defended and cherished.

But they do not answer the three questions that every reflective individual will ask at some time in his or her life: Who am I? Why am I here? How then shall I live? The result is that the 21st century has left us with a maximum of choice and a minimum of meaning.

Religion has returned because it is hard to live without meaning. That is why no society has survived for long without either a religion or a substitute for religion. The 20th century showed, brutally and definitively, that the great modern substitutes for religion—nation, race, political ideology—are no less likely to offer human sacrifices to their surrogate deities.

The religion that has returned is not the gentle, quietist and ecumenical form that we in the West have increasingly come to expect. Instead it is religion at its most adversarial and aggressive. It is the greatest threat to freedom in the postmodern world. It is the face of what I call “altruistic evil” in our time: evil committed in a sacred cause, in the name of high ideals.

The 21st century will be more religious than the 20th for several reasons. First is that, in many ways, religion is better adapted to a world of global instantaneous communication than are nation states and existing political institutions.

Second is the failure of Western societies after World War II to address the most fundamental of human needs: the search for identity. The world’s great faiths offer meaning, direction, a code of conduct and a set of rules for the moral and spiritual life in ways that the free-market, liberal democratic West does not.
The third reason has to do with demography. World-wide, the most religious groups have the highest birthrates. Over the next half-century, as Eric Kaufmann has documented in his book “Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?”, there will be a massive transformation in the religious makeup of much of the world, with Europe leading the way. With the sole exception of the U.S., the West is failing to heed the Darwinian imperative of passing on its genes to the next generation.

This leaves us little choice but to re-examine the theology that leads to violent conflict in the first place. If we do not do the theological work, we will face a continuation of the terror that has marked our century thus far, for it has no other natural end.

The challenge is not only to Islam but also to Judaism and Christianity. None of the great religions can say, in unflinching self-knowledge, “Our hands never shed innocent blood.”

As Jews, Christians and Muslims, we have to be prepared to ask the most uncomfortable questions. Does the God of Abraham want his disciples to kill for his sake? Does he demand human sacrifice? Does he rejoice in holy war? Does he want us to hate our enemies and terrorize unbelievers? Have we read our sacred texts correctly? What is God saying to us, here, now? We are not prophets but we are their heirs, and we are not bereft of guidance on these fateful issues.

As one who values market economics and liberal democratic politics, I fear that the West doesn’t fully understand the power of the forces that oppose it. Passions are at play that run deeper and stronger than any calculation of interests. Reason alone will not win this battle. Nor will invocations of words like “freedom” and “democracy.” To some, they sound like compelling ideals, but to others, they are the problem against which they are fighting, not the solution they embrace.

Today Jews, Christians and Muslims must stand together, in defense of humanity, the sanctity of life, religious freedom and the honor of God himself. The real clash of the 21st century will not be between civilizations or religions but within them. It will be between those who accept and those who reject the separation of religion and power.

What then should we do? We must put the same long-term planning into strengthening religious freedom as was put into the spread of religious extremism. The proponents of radical Islam have worked for decades to marginalize the more open, gracious, intellectual and mystical traditions that in the past were the source of Islam’s greatness.

It has been a strategy remarkable for its long time-horizon, precision, patience and dedication. If moderation and religious freedom are to prevail, they will require no less. We must train a generation of religious leaders and educators who embrace the world in its diversity and sacred texts in their maximal generosity.

There must be an international campaign against the teaching and preaching of hate. Education in many Islamic countries remains a disgrace. If children continue to be taught that nonbelievers are destined for hell and that Christians and Jews are the greater and lesser Satan, if radio, television, websites and social media pour out a nonstop stream of paranoia and incitement, then Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with its commitment to religious freedom, will mean nothing. All the military interventions in the world will not stop the violence.

We need to recover the absolute values that make Abrahamic monotheism the humanizing force it has been at its best: the sanctity of life, the dignity of the individual, the twin imperatives of justice and compassion, the insistence on peaceful modes of resolving conflicts, forgiveness for the injuries of the past and devotion to a future in which all the children of the world can live together in grace and peace.

These are the ideals on which Jews, Christians and Muslims can converge, widening their embrace to include those of other faiths and none. This does not mean that human nature will change, or that politics will cease to be an arena of conflict. All it means is that politics will remain politics and not become religion.
We also need to insist on the simplest moral principle of all: the principle of reciprocal altruism, otherwise known as tit-for-tat. This says: As you behave to others, so will others behave to you. If you seek respect, you must give respect. If you ask for tolerance, you must demonstrate tolerance. If you wish not to be offended, then you must make sure you do not offend.

Wars are won by weapons, but it takes ideas to win a peace. To be a child of Abraham is to learn to respect the other children of Abraham even if their way is not ours, their covenant not ours, their understanding of God different from ours. Our common humanity must precedes our religious differences.

Yes, there are passages in the sacred scriptures of each of the Abrahamic monotheisms that, interpreted literally, can lead to hatred, cruelty and war. But Judaism, Christianity and Islam all contain interpretive traditions that in the past have read them in the larger context of coexistence, respect for difference and the pursuit of peace, and can do so today. Fundamentalism—text without context, and application without interpretation—is not faith but an aberration of faith.

With the rise of radical political Islam, our world has become suddenly dangerous not only to Jews, Christians and others but to Muslims who find themselves on the wrong side of the Sunni-Shiite divide. There will be military and political responses, but there must also be a religious one, or the others will fail.

We must raise a generation of young Jews, Christians, Muslims and others to know that it is not piety but sacrilege to kill in the name of the God of life, hate in the name of the God of love, wage war in the name of the God of peace, and practice cruelty in the name of the God of compassion.

Now is the time for us to say what we have failed to say in the past: We are all the children of Abraham. We are precious in the sight of God. We are blessed. And to be blessed, no one has to be cursed. God’s love does not work that way. God is calling us to let go of hate and the preaching of hate, and to live at last as brothers and sisters, true to our faith and a blessing to others regardless of their faith, honoring God’s name by honoring his image, humankind.

Lord Sacks is the former chief rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the British Commonwealth. This essay is adapted from his new book, “Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence,” which will be published by Schocken on Oct. 13.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-defeat-religious-violence-1443798275

How to spot violent radicals

Saskatoon StarPhoenix
STEWART BELL,
NATIONAL POST
September 13, 2015

The attacks that killed two Canadian soldiers in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu last October left many asking the same question: why?

Why had Michael Zehaf-Bibeau and Martin Couture-Rouleau become terrorists?

But a new book by the government's former senior adviser on violent extremism argues that asking why is a dead end. The reasons people have joined armed Islamist groups are so varied, there is just no pattern, Phil Gurski writes in The Threat From Within: Recognizing Al Qaeda-Inspired Radicalization and Terrorism in the West.

"The 'why' question is natural and I think it feeds an instinctive human need," Gurski said. "But we're never going to figure the why part out."

The better question to ask is how it happens, he says. Understanding that would mean it could be recognized and dealt with - whether through family and community intervention or, in more serious cases, intelligence and police work. That may be the best hope for stopping it before anyone else gets hurt.

"Violent radicalization may be complicated, but it is usually detectable - if you know what to look for," Gurski writes in the book slated for release next month, during the anniversary of the Ottawa and Quebec attacks.

The book is not a tell-all.

No secrets are revealed. Instead, Gurski draws on his more than three decades as a Canadian intelligence analyst to demystify the national security issue that is preoccupying governments everywhere.

He started work at the Communications Security Establishment in 1983, two months before the Soviet Union's nuclear early-warning alarm triggered, having falsely identified the launch of Minuteman intercontinental missiles from U.S. bases. The mistake almost started a nuclear war.

Back then, the Cold War was the overwhelming focus of the CSE, which hired him at age 22, partly because he was adept in six languages. But Gurski was one of a dozen analysts given the job of keeping track of everything else going on in the world.

Like terrorism.

After picking up Arabic and Farsi, he became a Middle East expert, but he said there was no real sense of urgency around terrorism, even after the name Osama bin Laden began to surface. "Terrorism was around back then but we didn't pay a lot of attention," he said.

Months after he moved to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, however, the 9/11 attacks vaulted terrorism to the top of the agenda. Could it happen here? he asked. He began studying radicalization and continued to do so until his retirement last month.

He examined case after case in which Canadians had bought into the manufactured al-Qaida narrative, which claims the West is at war against Islam and true Muslims are therefore obliged to wage war against the West until it is defeated.

From his insider's perch, he came to the opinion there was no template for what motivated people to become terrorists, but there were definitely "tangible, observable behaviours and attitudes" associated with radicalization.

Just as you could tell if someone was on drugs from the way they behaved, those undergoing radicalization likewise give off consistent signals. He lists a dozen of them in the book, starting with "a sudden increase in intolerant religiosity."

Those on the path to radicalization will also reject differing interpretations of Islam. They will isolate themselves from non-Muslims, sometimes refusing to have contact with them or deal with their businesses. They will condemn the Western way of life, particularly democracy, homosexuality and gender equality. They will denounce Western policies, portraying them as part of "an anti-Islamic crusade," he says.

Canada's contribution to the NATO mission in Afghanistan is one example. (As Gurski notes, however, extremists have created a damned-if-you-do, damnedif-you-don't scenario: any Western military intervention is automatically spun as part of the war on Islam, but so is the decision not to intervene in a conflict.)'

"Differences and disagreements about Canadian government policies are not uncommon in this country," he writes. "The threat lies not in the differences of opinion but in the belief that Canada has an overt animosity toward Islam and therefore must be punished through acts of terrorism."

A desire to travel to conflict zones is also an indicator, as well as obsessions with jihadist websites, the al-Qaida narrative, martyrdom and the end-of-times. Even if those who show these signs prove to be non-violent, Gurski argues the matter should be taken seriously and their views should be challenged.

In the interview, Gurski said it was important to have a clear and accurate understanding of how radicalization happens. He recalled meeting the mother of a Canadian extremist killed in Syria and asking her to walk him through what she had observed in his behaviour.

She described how her son converted, cut himself off from his former friends, became intolerant of other faiths, denounced the Western lifestyle and despised Western foreign policy. The signs were all there, she just didn't know them. "That's what I'm trying to do with the book," he said.

He believes family, friends and religious leaders will often be the first to notice such behaviour, long before security and law enforcement hear about it.

"It is my hope that by learning what the indicators can mean, people best positioned to detect them in their early stages will be empowered to not ignore them but act," he said.

Canada seems ready for it, he added.

In 2006, when the Toronto 18 terrorist group was caught plotting bomb attacks in downtown Toronto, the arrests were met with denial. Almost a decade later, after many more arrests and two successful attacks, he believes there is more understanding of the problem. During the last two years of Gurski's career, he spoke to many community groups.

"In most cases what really impressed me was how engaged people were," he said. "They know it's happening in their midst, they're a little bit confused about it."

He said while people generally want to help, they're not always sure what to do and may have misconceptions about extremism. The "solutions" they propose often include jobs, education, integration, mental health funding, addressing underlying grievances and developing "a true understanding of Islam."

But he calls those unhelpful against radicalization. He supports early intervention programs run by people with the proper training. But he cautions there are times police will have to investigate and make arrests. He also wants Canadians to know that those threatening to attack Canada in ISIL videos are not necessarily the monsters we make them out to be. In fact, they tend to be fairly ordinary.

"They are us," he writes.

http://www.thestarphoenix.com/spot+violent+radicals/11361740/story.html

The Use of the Philosophy of Martyrdom within Religious Cults for Acts of Terrorism

 Masoud Banisadr (UK) 

Author and formerly of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran/sāzmān-e mojāhedin-e khalq-e irān 

FECRIS Conference
London April 2010

Abstract: In this speech I will argue; first there is a difference between Terrorism as an isolated violent act committed by an individual, not related to any terrorist group, or as one of many different activities or tactics of a popular or political organisation from one hand with a Terrorist organisation on the other hand. Then I will argue that any terrorist organisation either is a destructive cult or to survive has no option but eventually to change into one. Finally I define a destructive cult and conclude by explaining that facing a terrorist organisation is completely different from facing the problem of terrorism and violence and if we are serious to get rid of this ugly phenomena we have to understand destructive cults and through that understanding face terrorist organisations.

Terrorism:

Terrorism in my view is a social disease like any other, such as murder, rubbery, rape or theft; cause to its existence not only lies in social problems such as poverty or unemployment, but injustice in any form and shape. It has been with us since beginning of civilization and unfortunately will remain with us as long as there is any kind of injustice in any society.

It disgusts us to remember it, to think about it, and even more, if anyone tries to understand it and find the logic behind it.

Like any other disease; for terrorism, we either can fight symptoms, prescribing a very strong pain killer that can harm healthy part of organism as well; or we can try to understand it, to find the cause of it and seek to find a real and long lasting solution for that.

Unfortunately as usual governments have a habit of going for the former one and only when they are forced by public opinion and demands will go for the latter one. This is why most of government’s policies toward terrorism are aiming to face terrorists, rather than cause of terrorism.

Well my talk today is not about terrorism in general but terrorist organisations in particular and their metamorphosis into destructive cults.

Organised crime versus isolated crime:

Importance of doctrine or cause for an isolated crime versus organised crime:

When a crime changes into an organised crime; not only it will mature and will intensify but its nature and its attributes will alter as well, sometimes into even opposite of its original form. For example if poverty and unemployment are the main causes of theft and rubbery; therefore facing poverty and unemployment might diminish or at least lessen those kind of crimes; in organised crime, although still existence of these problems helps new mafias to recruit new members, but facing poverty or unemployment can not resolve the problem of organised crime, as now its strength depends to its leader and sophistication of its organisation and not original causes of its existence. Well I am sure most of you have seen the movie ‘The God Father’ and have enjoyed it and there is no need for me to elaborate more on this point. What I conclude is that, although cause for an isolated crime is the main reason for its existence and resolving it will diminish or at least will lessen it; in organised crime, cause will loose its importance and will not play the same decisive rule in existence or none existence of the organisation.

Back to terrorism; let me give you an example: Although MEK that I was member of born with an ideology based on Islam and Marxism and recruit with anti Imperialism and anti Zionism and social justice slogans; and later after the revolution, when I along tens of thousands more students of schools and universities joined it, used any ills, any injustice or lack of freedom that existed in Iran, to recruit; but after it changed into a terrorist organisation and then into a destructive cult, its survival, its internal strength had nothing to do with either of causes of its existence, its original slogans, or what was happening in Islamic world or in Iran. To survive and to fulfil the leader’s dreams, contrary to their nationalistic slogans; during Iran-Iraq war, they collaborated with Sadam Hussein and hand in hand with Iraqi army they fought with Iran. Sadam’s generous assistance to MEK; financial help, free land to build their bases in, sophisticated armament etc; didn’t mean that MEK will be loyal to their host, when they saw American army, they announced their readiness to help Americans and fight along side of new victorious army[i].

All said it doesn’t mean that MEK now is going to be loyal toward American; because cults are not loyal to any partner or friend, ideology, policy, slogan, agreement but only those that help their survival and their goal’s advancement.

As matter of fact for me as for almost all members, after MEK’s ideological revolution (the name they gave to their brain washing techniques[ii]), Iran and Islam where not important any more; or at least not nearly as important as the existence and success of the organisation and its leader. Then in a letter to the leader I explained this change in myself and other members by admitting that if they ask us to choose between happiness and success of Iranian and Muslims in one hand and victory of our leader any where around the world even if he becomes president of Zimbabwe, we all will choose the latter one. Of course then our logic was based on this assumption that if our leader finds a foothold anywhere in the world, soon he can expand his influence and can save the whole world and change the history. Yes MEK was and still is using any ills that might exist in Iran to recruit, for propaganda purposes and for legitimisation of its existence, but for its members what is happening in Iran or as matter of fact in the whole world outside, is not slightly as important as their internal relations, their absolute loyalty and obedience toward the leader.

In case of Al-Qaeda, I can claim the same thing. If the misery and hardship of Palestinians, the existing injustice against them and unconditional support of the United States for actions of Israel is one of the main causes of dissatisfaction of Muslims toward west in general and the United States in particular and as a result this is one of the main effective tools of recruitment by terrorist organisations; still in an imaginary situation, if this problem can be resolved, in my view we might be able to stop Al-Qaeda to recruit more, but we can not claim victory over the organisation. As the only way destructive cults such as MEK or Al-Qaeda can for good leave violence behind, is either due to their victory over the whole world or their total annihilation. Cult of personality of Hitler is an example that the world has not forgotten yet. 

Terrorist organisations to survive have no alternative but to change into a destructive cult:

I will call an organization a terrorist organization if its only tactic, or at least its main tactic, for reaching its goal is an act of terrorism. According to this definition, I will not call any government or popular political organizations, even if they use terrorism to deal with their enemies, terrorists because they are dealing with other problems of the society as well; terrorism is not their sole tactic or the pillar of their actions in dealing with their daily problems and objectives.

In a paper recently published by Cultic Studies Review[iii]; I argued: ‘If the organization’s sole or main tactic is terrorism, sooner or later it must begin changing the morality of its members because it cannot match the morality of the society from which they have come. The organization must either change the member’s morality and belief system or accept factions within and defections from the group on a large scale.’ Therefore soon or late, to hold on to their members, to keep them away from emotional and moral influence of family, friends and society, Terrorist organisations have no choice but to isolate their members at least psychologically and if they can physically from wider society and start the process of mind manipulation of members under different name and pretext. This is the path toward changing completely into a destructive cult.

As an example of how morality and rule of conduct of a terrorist organisation contradicts the society’s customs, culture, faith and ideology, I can mention suicide operations of MEK that started on summer 1981, for example the killing of Ayatollah Madani, a religious representative of Khomeini in Tabriz,[iv] and another suicide operation, the killing of Ayatollah Dastghayb, a religious representative of Khomeini, in Shiraz.[v] By the way, if I am not mistaken, these are either the first or among the first suicide operations of Muslims in modern times.[vi] Another significance of this operation at Shiraz was that, for the first time, a female operative and not a male had performed a terrorism act in a Muslim country. Other significant aspects of these operations that were totally against morals of the society, included:

• Breaking the taboo of suicide. Muslims, like Christians, believe suicide is a great sin, and the one who commits it is worthy of going to hell.
• Breaking the principal related to taking no action in public places. Other innocent people were among the deaths.[vii]
• The fact that many suicide bombers killed their victims during Friday sermons, where the Mosque and any place in which people pray traditionally are considered as sanctuaries. According to the religious rulings, even churches and synagogues are safe from violence.
• The fact that they killed a member of the clergy, an Ayatollah, an old noncombatant person—again, along with women and children, all prohibited by Islamic law and principles.[viii]

As you can see, when your tactic and strategy changes to solely terrorism, you cannot be bound by popular morals and tradition, or rules of conduct of any faith or culture. Ironically, although I can not disagree more with many of statements of President Bush and Mr. Blair, still I have to say that I agree totally with them in claiming that Terrorist organisations (but not all those who use terrorism as one of many of their tactics) are against our way of living, our democracy and our freedom. Although I have to add that terrorist organisations as well as almost all destructive cults not only are against Western values but they are against morals and values of all modern, civilized societies, to be Eastern or Western doesn’t make any difference. Of course they benefit fully from advancement of science or any existence of freedom and democracy or any avenue open to them in different societies to recruit and to advertise themselves, as Al-Qaeda and MEK benefit fully from modern technology such as Internet, Mobile phones, … for propaganda purposes. They might even go as far as introducing themselves as champion of modern values including democracy, freedom or equality, as MEK does. But when it comes to their internal relations, they easily show their real colour and how much do they hate these values. And if God forbid they reach to power using the same democracy as Hitler did, they will create kind of dictatorship and atrocity unseen in any civilization.

When a group due to bypassing people’s moral and values, loses the support of wider society, its members and organizational supporters become more important.[ix] Then the organization faces this dilemma: What should it do with the morality and beliefs of its members and supporters? After all, they are, or were, ordinary individuals from the same society, bound by the same code of morality and beliefs, and responsible at least in front of their family and friends.

The answer for any organization at this point of transition is obvious: “Change them or lose them.”’[x]

To change morality, set of beliefs, character and personality of members; terrorist organisations have no alternative but to start the process of mind manipulation of the members. Either they can do that, which in this case they will have all essential elements of being a destructive cult or they can’t and they will faction, face major defections, and eventually have no choice but to change their tactics and therefore transform themselves from a terrorist organisations into something else, perhaps a political one such as IRA in Ireland or disintegrate completely like Pykar; a Marxist organisation, an offshoot of MEK that could not change into a cult and eventually had to publicly announce its dissolution.

Terrorist organisations versus destructive cults, which one is worse?

Yes in my view Terrorist organisations have no choice but to change into a destructive cult, but will they change into something better, more acceptable or worse? Which one is worse to be? A terrorist organisation or a destructive cult? In my view a destructive cult; because of two main reasons:

1. when an organisation changes into a destructive cult, it is not any more abided by any norm, morality or rule. Its doctrine and rule of conducts can change easily at any minute to serve two essential goals of the cult; survival and materialization of leader’s childish dream. Therefore even if a cult forced to leave violence as its main tactic behind, as MEK disarmed by American forces had to do so[xi]; still they can switch back to terrorism at any time they can and they need to. In contrast, organisations of any type, even terrorist ones (before changing into a cult) are loyal to set of idea and principles or at least aims and objectives, as for example IRA’s goal was to unite Ireland, therefore in some extent they are predictable, reachable, dialog-able and perhaps even it is possible to influence their policies and change them into more peaceful and democratic type of groupings.
2. The second reason why I think it is more difficult to face destructive cults rather than any other type of organisations is due to change of character of members of destructive cults. One of the slogans of MEK’s leaders was that we have to change into an ant, learn from ant to be selfless and act instinctively as our leader wishes so without any doubt or question. If MEK’s leaders openly and bluntly were mentioning and demanding this ancient desire of all tyrants from their members; it doesn’t mean that those who don’t mention it don’t pave their way to achieve it. In my view this is the goal and objective of all destructive cults and this is why it is too difficult to face these groups.

It is very difficult for us in wider society with normal life to understand a suicide bomber In London, Madrid or New York; as it was difficult for tenth century Iranian people, Western Crusaders and rulers of that time to understand suicide actions of cult of Assassins. Then their rationalization for Assassin’s actions was that they have been narcotised by perhaps Hashish where their given name comes from. And these days I am hearing from some experts that suicide bombers kill themselves to go to paradise for perhaps beautiful Hories. In my view both are wrong; perhaps assassins were using some sort of narcotics or  some modern suicide bombers think they can satisfy their sexual desires more after death than while they are alive but the main reason is that members of destructive cults change; they gradually loose their selfhood; their individuality, their instinct for self preservation and even self production; they loose their personal character, principles, and even emotions; and instead of all that, they become absolute loyal and obedient follower of the leader. And in my view this is why it is too difficult to face them and stop them. They will become like one of those shape-shifter characters of some fiction movies. One minute they are smiling, kind, happy person and minutes later they can change into an angry, violent and merciless individual, able to harm anybody and kill even innocent children. They are not predictable and recognizable. They don’t have set of believes that we can understand them as a basis for discussion and perhaps negotiation. They don’t have personal desire and weakness that can be used to change them. They seek pain, hardship, and even death therefore they can not be threatened as they welcome to be a ‘victim of the wider society’s atrocities and Martyr for the leader and his slogans. Therefore none of conventional method of dealing with criminals is useful in facing members of destructive cults. Later I will try to explain my answer to this problem.

Terrorism - resurrection of an ancient feature of destructive cults

Above I argued; all Terrorist organisations to survive as ‘Terrorism’ pillar of their strategy or their only or main activity have no choice but to change into a destructive cult. But opposite is not always true. Not all destructive cults are a terrorist organisation.

While destructive cults are not necessarily terrorists; still terrorism is not new feature of them. Perhaps the oldest one recorded in history are Zealots who fought against Romans in 48 AD[xii]. Zealots perhaps were also pioneer of mass suicide action. When Eleazar Their leader found out that there is no way that he can win, asked all members to kill themselves. Centuries later we could see repeat of their action in Waco and Jones Town. Another example or perhaps one of the long lasting terrorist cults was Thuggee; Thuggee stranglers preyed upon India until finally suppressed in the mid nineteenth century by the British.[xiii]

But perhaps the most famous Terrorist cult, ancestor of MEK and Al-Qaeda are Assassins[xiv], who gave us the word Assassination[xv]. As MEK and Al-Qaeda that start recruiting with anti American slogans, Assassins recruited their members with excuse of occupation of Iran first by Arabs and then by Turks in tenth century AD.

While they used nationalistic slogans for recruiting, as a cult they soon showed that nothing is important for them but the survival and progress of the cult. As MEK to survive and progress, collaborated with the enemies of Iran such as Sadam Hussein of Iraq; Assassins too, to survive and progress they were prepared to work along side any body including working with Arabs against Turks; with crusaders even ‘god-less’ Mongols against Arab Muslims and then easily change side again for cause of the cult and not people or country or faith[xvi].

As other cults their doctrine, in this case Islam was as important for them as it was useful to recruit, and when it wasn’t, they could change it in any way they wished[xvii].

To change their members into a killing machine, again the same as MEK and Al-Qaeda they used only two concepts of Islam; Jihad and Martyrdom with their twisted interpretation and ignoring Islamic rules of conduct[xviii]. The same as MEK and Al-Qaeda they showed they have no respect for human life and to pursue their goals they killed any body on their way, anywhere, even old religious men[xix] during pray time in a mosque[xx].

As MEK and perhaps Al-Qaeda and all other destructive cults; to brainwash their members and to alter them from an individual into a killing machine; following leader’s order instinctively, without slightest question or doubt; they had to have full control over sexuality of their members. While MEK or David Koresh ordered all members to divorce their spouses and forget about sex for life and after life; Assassins used to castrate their young suicide killers.

How do I define destructive cults?

At this point I would like briefly explain how do I define destructive cults:

Destructive cults according to my definition have four essential ingredients or elements:

1 charismatic leader: 

Unlike some experts who define cults and categorise them according to their ideology or doctrine, my definition of cults starts with its leader, rather than its doctrine. This is the leader with his childish ego and Narcissist character, who cannot fulfil his unrealistic needs and materialise his gigantic ambitions in the real world that creates his toy-like mini-world in psychological or physical isolation of members from the wider society within a destructive cult. In my view cult leaders are completely different from ordinary political leader because of their attributes such as: Charisma and charm, narcissism or childlike ego, their superiority complex, their need for worshippers and their loneliness.

This is the leader, who to attract and recruit disciples, needs to have a cause, a doctrine or an ideology. Cause or doctrine for a cult leader is a mean and not the aim or objective. He or she chooses his or her doctrine according to the public beliefs, needs, injustices, existing ills of the society, or groaning of the pool that he wants to fish from. Their objective is to find worshippers, toys of their dream childish world, to create that world and unite their internal ego with the external one. What they choose as ‘cause’ or ‘doctrine’ is not important and no cult leader feels obliged to be loyal toward his primary messages or objectives.

2 Black and white doctrine, objective or cause:

Unlike some expert explaining doctrine or ideology of destructive cults, I will not name or define them according to their superficial and if I may say hypocritical common factors with popular beliefs such as Christianity, Islam or even ideologies such as Nationalism or Marxism[xxi].

Therefore according to my definition of destructive cults, what they choose to call their doctrine, however they define it, and no matter how loyal they seem to be toward it, or how steadfastly they seem to observe the faith’s ethics, are not as important as the common factors of doctrine in all destructive cults. Attributes such as believing in the world of black and white; their exclusiveness; (versus inclusiveness of other social groupings; who might have some dogma but their members and followers are free to do anything even though there are guidelines to observation of a few things; even dogmas of most extreme religion’s followers are limited and can be numbered while destructive cults have dogma on everything except perhaps a very few aspects of life. In other words all aspects of life of a destructive cult’s member are decided by the leader. The member has no freedom of choice on anything beyond a few very limited aspects of their lives. Other common factors in their doctrines are: Their stealth and deception or belief in the idea that the end justifies the means.

3-Totalistic organisation:

While the organisation is not even as important as doctrine of the cult and not certainly as important as method of mind manipulation that cult leaders use to change their disciples from who they are into their ideal worshipper, and though they can easily due to size and circumstances change the shape of their organisation, still we can see some similarities between different destructive cult’s organisations. Similarities such as that all are totalitarian, therefore there is no room for democracy, serious questions or doubt or criticism toward the leader and his or her orders; Ironic discipline; Hard work; autonomy from wider society; secrecy and surveillance; membership for life or closed exit doors. In case of Al-Qaeda; although it has changed into some sort of franchise, still in every little cell of Al-Qaeda franchise we can find this common elements of the organisation of destructive cults.

4-Mind manipulation

Cult leaders, in order to build their childish world and to satisfy their tendency toward ‘all or nothing’, have no choice but to isolate themselves and their little world psychologically and physically (if they can) and find ways to change free men and women recruited from the wider society into toy like objects of their dream world. These kinds of gurus have no choice but to use some sort of method of mind manipulation if they are to keep their toy like disciples in a very narrow and absolute line, without any question, any doubt, any restraint or contradiction, any private or personal belief, principle, desire, hope, dream or thought and even emotion and feeling; to change them so they can be flexible enough for their game or their play.

Whenever we talk about mind manipulation, suddenly we face two extremes; on the one hand those who deny the existence of any such methods; and on the opposite side those who call simple influence techniques of recruiting ‘brainwashing’; they call members of any cults, even non-destructive ones ‘Zombies’ or ‘machines’. I personally don’t believe that there is any method in existence that can totally brainwash a person, overcoming the effects of gene or early education by parents and society that shape the core character and personality of a person. That being said, I have seen changes of my own personality and hundreds if not thousands of other members of MEK through the use of different methods of mind manipulation; therefore I am a strong believer in the existence of methods that can change character, personality, the system of beliefs and the perception of selfhood, in a person. These methods can push a person out of the driving seat of his or her own will into passenger seat, and force  a surrender to the leader, almost completely. As I mentioned, I don’t believe that a person can change into, for example, a ‘Zombie’ or a ‘machine’, but at the same time I have to say that comparing those who use these kinds of words in describing cult members with those who deny the existence of mind manipulation methods, the former view in my opinion are much closer to the reality than the latter. Yes, I believe real, loyal, obedient members of destructive cults are much closer to an ‘ant’ that Rajavi wanted us to be, or a ‘Zombie’ or a ‘machine’ than the free men and women that we see in a wider society, even in a dictatorship, despite all the constraints that might exist on their free will. 

To explain mind manipulation I have divided it into three different categories or phases. Firstly, use of rational and influence techniques for changing new recruit’s beliefs, as well as a tool for recruitment. After changing recruit’s beliefs, the cult leader’s main task will be how to stabilise or freeze new beliefs, and how to neutralise the new recruit’s tendency to return to his previous system of beliefs due to the pressure of his personality and his feelings toward his old way of life, family and friends. This is achieved mainly via isolation and change of behaviour that I call mind control. Next, in order to fulfil his desire to change free men and women into fully transformer-like toys that can be bent and shaped as he wishes, a destructive cult leader has to change the disciple’s individual personality into the collective cult-personality; this is carried out mainly by the use of emotion that I call brainwashing[xxii].

Facing Terrorist cults is different from facing terrorism:

As I explained, when a terrorist organisation changes into a destructive cult; its original doctrine, ideology or cause is not nearly as important as it was for members when they were recruited, this is the main difference between individual terrorists, or organisations that use terrorism as one of many of their tactics in one hand and Terrorist organisations on the other hand. Two decisive elements for survival of destructive cults are: 1- the leader and 2- the system of mind manipulation. Therefore while in one hand to deal with individual terrorists and other type of organisation we can reason, educate, deal and even negotiate, in short use all political and rational means to persuade them to leave violence and terrorism as one of their tactics behind and use political means to pursue their goals; on the other hand in dealing with destructive cults including terrorist organisations use of these means are in vain.

Again while in former ones we have to recognize their commitment to their doctrine or goal and use it as a strong and decisive base for education, reasoning, showing the contradictions, and even negotiation; in latter ones the biggest mistake is to recognize them for example as Muslim,Christian Nationalist or Marxist, especially publicly and even worse to accept them as NRM or new spokespersons of those faith, ideologies or even causes. Unfortunately this was the biggest mistake of Western politician, media and even some academics and intellectuals after 9-11 who recognized Al-Qaeda as Muslim and worse those who labelled them as Islamist or even some who equalled their propaganda and their actions with Islam. I strongly believe that these people with calling Terrorist organisations, Muslim and not a destructive cult have advocated and helped them, in a way that they couldn’t even dream of it. They could gain sympathy of many Muslims who were unhappy with for example policies of west toward Israel-Palestinian conflict; Osma became the second most named of new born boys in Arab countries, and Al-Qaeda recruited as many young unsatisfied, confused Muslims as they didn’t know how to educate, organize and use them. I hope one day at least those who equalled Al-Qaeda with Islam realise what have they done and how they have changed into biggest advocates of terrorist organisations and hopefully are forced at least to apologize from hundred of thousands of victims of recent terrorism around the world.

To face terrorist organisations we have to research, learn and understand their strong points, the most important of all to understand how they manipulate mind of their disciples and neutralize them. In my view the most important elements of their mind manipulations are 1-psycological and perhaps physical isolation of new recruits from wider society. 2-And use of strong emotion of Muslims in general and young Muslims in particular toward what is happening in the Islamic world.

1. Psychological isolation: In above mentioned paper[xxiii]I have tried to show how destructive cults in general and Terrorist cults in particular create phobia, paranoia, hate and disgust toward outside world and in this way psychologically isolate their new recruits from wider society and dehumanise or sub-humanise none members. Unfortunately again after 9/11 Western governments, and media not only didn’t try to neutralize this elements but on the contrary to satisfy public opinion that they are dealing with the problem, in a way, they even greatly helped Terrorist Organisations in isolating their members from wider society.  To face these elements we have to understand, realise, and recognize that within any members of a destructive cut, there is a dying individual thirsty of a little encouragement, kindness, understanding, and helping hand to survive and to save itself. Let me give you two examples of my own. When after being awake for more than 24 hours, I was travelling from Paris to Washington; in the plane an old lady sitting beside me when saw how tired I am, showed a little kindness and understanding toward me and for example kept my lunch for me till I woke up. Another example when I injured myself by falling from a step, because of my back problem, a friend who was not a member of MEK helped me and cared about my wound. You can not imagine these two little genuine understanding and kindness how much helped me in breaking the idea of that we as members of MEK are above all and helped me to neutralize the idea of dehumanisation or sub-humanisation of outsiders in my mind. Imprisoning, insulting, beating, water-boarding, torturing, members of destructive cults, will weaken those dying individual and will strengthen his or her cultic or collective personality, making him more steadfast in whatever he or she is doing. Perhaps for the safety of general public we can not avoid random stop and search policy, perhaps we have to arrest and imprison some even by mistake, but these are not as important or as damaging as what do we do after stopping or arresting a potential recruit of a destructive cult. If we educate public in general and the police and the politician and the media in particular that members of destructive cults are victims and not criminals, in need of psychological help and not punishment, then we can face this problem without creating new victims and martyrs for destructive cults to recruit and brainwash their members even more.
2. Emotion: Yes in the west we might not be able to do much about Muslim’s feelings and if I may say Human feelings toward what is happening around the world, injustices, discriminations and atrocities. We cannot stop our media to show these news and if we do as sometimes our media does, in my view we make the biggest mistake of all as not only we acknowledge terrorist organisation’s arguments, but we ignore our own values and discredit ourselves as free, democratic and fair society; as a result we encourage not only potential young recruits of terrorist cults toward alternative information sources, but we will push them even more toward  being educated and attracted toward violent means of facing their emotions. In my view we have to be at least advocate of our own values, our liberty, our democracy, our freedom, and our fairness. We have to diminish any need for alternative terrorist or cultic source of information by giving first hand real news of injustices ourselves. We have to understand, and recognize emotion of people especially young Muslims toward injustices, discriminations, and atrocities then educate them, show them, and facilitate them toward alternative means for directing their emotions. Recently I saw a documentary in Channel Four under title of ‘Britain’s Islamic Republic’[xxiv]; in this documentary producer and presenter of the program while in my view had some right and just and correct point of view, unfortunately at the same time was trying to ‘reveal’ and ‘discredit’ those who are trying to find their voice in British parliament by arguing that they are trying to infiltrate or influence Labour party or introduce their own candidate for parliamentary election. Well I hope I am wrong and discrediting actions of those who seek to find a political avenue as an answer to cry of these young people, was not the intention of producers of that program as I believe this is exactly what we have to do, encouraging and showing young Muslims how can they direct their emotion, their feel of responsibility, their need of doing something against injustice toward peaceful and political means and prove to them that this can work and is the right path toward.

[i] In RAND report; Pages 10 and 11; it has been stated: ‘The MEK insisted that it dispatched a letter to DOS (U.S. Department of State) in February 2003 declaring its intention to be a neutral party during the impending invasion of Iraq and stating that it would not fire on coalition forces, even in self-defence. It also claimed to have offered to fight on behalf of the coalition. (RAND; National Defense Research Institute; is a non-profit research organisation providing objective analysis and effective solution that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. Its report; titled: 'The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq; A Policy Conundrum 2009' was sponsored by Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America. The full report can be found in:http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG871/;)

[ii] To learn more about MEK and their ideological revolution you can refer to either MASOUD; Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel; Published by SAQI Book; 2004. The unedited version of my memoirs also can be found on my website: http://www.banisadr.info/mylifestory.htm Or you can read ‘The Iranian Mojahedin’ published by Yale University press New Haven and London – 1989 written by Ervand Abrahamian; professor of history at Baruch College, City University of New York.

[iii] ‘Terrorist Organizations Are Cults’; Masoud Banisadr; Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2009, PP: PAGE 3. You can also see this article on my website at: http://www.banisadr.info/ICSA2009.htm

[iv] MEK’s publication, Nashrieh … December 11, 1981.

[v] MEK’s Publication, Nashrieh … December 18, 1981.

[vi] “Suicide terror predates the modern manifestation of car bombs that began in Lebanon. It is neither unique to the modern period nor confined to any single region or religion. The early historical antecedents of terrorism include the Jewish zealots and Sicarii in the first century AD, during the time of the Second Temple until its destruction in 70 AD, The Hindu thugs in India from the time of Herodotus until 1836, the assassins of the twelfth century, anti-colonial movements in Malabar, and the Japanese Kamikaze during World War II. By examining these early examples of terrorism we can deduce certain general patterns that emerged and draw similarities between these early illustrations and the more recent phenomena. The common themes that emerge from the early case studies provide a template of what is happening today: the role of early education in creating adherents, the appearance of charismatic and ambitious leaders, disputes over occupied territory, and the ways in which religion was manipulated to induce followers to kill in the name of God” (from Dying to Kill by Mia Bloom, p. 4).

[vii] Of course, whenever ordinary people were among the deaths, they used to name them as agents or spies of the regime, or Basiji (members of the mobilization teams)…” Interesting, that among their terrorist activities at the time, they claimed the explosion of three bombs close to where Khomeini used to live (MEK’s publication Nashrieh, April 23, 1982) but denied other bombs that were exploded and included casualties of ordinary people, which could not be accepted even among MEK’s own organizational supporters. They claimed the acts were done by the regime itself, (MEK’s publication Nashrieh,September 10, 1982) or by another one (MEK’s publication Nashrieh, October 8, 1982). But they were not hesitant of even killing the manager of a state agency that by law had to give a rental report for all tenancies (MEK’s publication Nashrieh, May 14, 1982), or the head of a local organization for helping farmers (MEK’s publication Nashrieh, July 23, 1982). As a matter of fact, in the view of MEK and its supporters, whoever was supporting the regime was criminal and worthy of being killed. Later they changed very much as they started considering people were either with them or with the regime; therefore, whoever is not with them is collaborating with the regime and worthy of being killed. Therefore, within one year, they killed more than 2,000 people and proudly announced it themselves (MEK’s publication;Nashrieh number 55; 24/9/1982 also in MEK’s publication Mojahed Number 163; 4/8/1983 the number of killed by MEK between 20th of June 1982 and 20th of June 1983 was announced as 2800 people.). Of course later, as they gradually lost all their supporters in Iran due to their being killed either by execution or during armed struggle, they had to send terrorist teams from Iraq; therefore, it was not so easy to target high officials, and so they started exploding oil pipe lines (MEK’s publication Mojahed, June 14, 1993) or putting bombs in places like the tomb of Khomeini, which could result in the killing of ordinary people. (MEK’s publication Boltan, October 16, 1992).

[viii] The Rules of Jihad: Muslims generally realize that Jihad has its rules and conditions. In the Quran, God has emphasized that no one should violate these rules and overrule them. Abu Baker, the first Caliph after the prophet, referring to the Quran and the prophet’s sayings, instructed those who wished to consider themselves Muslim soldiers, “Do not betray; do not carry grudges; do not deceive; do not kill children; do not kill elderly; do not kill women; do not destroy beehives or burn them; do not cut down fruit bearing trees; do not slaughter sheep, cattle, or camels except for food. You will come upon people who spend their lives in monasteries; leave them on what they have dedicated their lives…” (from Heirs of the Prophet Muhammad by Barnaby Rogerson, p. 162). Furthermore, Ali, the fourth Caliph, set out more rules to put a stop to killing, including safeguarding POWs. He says, “No one turning his back shall be pursued; no one wounded shall be killed; whoever throws away his arms is safe.” Ali had pardoned with goodness. The dead from both sides were buried; only captured arms and animals could be held as war booty (from Heirs of the Prophet Muhammad by Barnaby Rogerson, p. 298).

[ix] “[when] Mojahedin realized that the second revolution was not at hand, and so began to prepare for a prolonged armed struggle, organizational militancy now took precedence over political expediency. Hard-core militants became more important than “fair-weather friends” and “fellow travelers”; the “quality” of members more important than quantity of sympathizers, organizational discipline more important than the appearance of internal democracy, and ideological purity in the rank and file more important than frequent contacts with outside sympathizers, especially if such sympathizers could contaminate the ordinary members. Thus, the outward-reaching attitude was replaced with an inward-looking attitude that treated allies as if they were potential enemies. The new view perceived those who were not fully for the Mojahedin as being against it. Having reached those conclusions, the Mojahedin began to squeeze “half-hearted friends” out of the National Council—some former members of the National Council believe that the Mojahedin could have ironed out its differences with Banisadr and the Kurdish Democratic Party. It destroyed Iranshahr when that paper [the Mojahedin] dared to publish a series of interviews with prominent exiles mildly critical of the organization. It freely accused critics of being SAVAK agents.” (from Ervand Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, p. 249)

[x] Terrorist Organizations Are Cults’; Masoud Banisadr; Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2009, PP: 164, 165

[xi] In RAND report we read: ‘After the 2003 invasion of Iraq by United States and United Kingdom and overthrow of Sadam Hussein’s regime; MEK was forced to surrender all its weapons. Since then the MEK claims that it formally rejected the use of violence. ‘Although there is limited documentary proof of this decision in either English or Farsi.’ (RAND report 2009: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG871/; The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq; P: 66) In the same report we read also that MEK’s leaders when ever they felt their relation with Americans is in good shape, they asked for return of their arms.

[xii] Zealots: ‘Beginning in 48 AD, the Zealots carried out terrorist campaigns to force insurrection against the Romans in Judea. These campaigns included the use of sicarii (dagger-men), who would infiltrate Roman-controlled cities and stab Jewish collaborators or Roman legionnaires with a sica, kidnap the staff of the Temple Guard for ransom, or poison their enemies. The Zealots' justification for their killing of other Jews was that their acts demonstrated the consequences of the immorality of collaborating with the Roman invaders, and exposed the fact that the Romans could not protect their Jewish collaborators.’ (Rex A. Hudson, 'The Sociology and psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and why?' Report prepared under an Interagency Agreement by the Federal Research Division, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, Library of Congress September 1999, 14. Cited from Mia Bloom; 'Dying to Kill; The Allure of Suicide terror'; Columbia University Press/ New York; 2007; P: 8) ‘Zealots saw themselves as revolutionary catalysts who moved men by force of their audacious action, exploiting mass expectations that a cataclysmic messianic deliverance was imminent. To generate a mass uprising, they escalated the struggle by shock tactics to manipulate fear, outrage, sympathy and guilt. Sometimes these emotional affects were provoked by terrorist atrocities which went beyond the consensual norms governing violence; at other times, they were produced by provoking the enemy into committing atrocities against his will (David C. Rapoport, University of California, Los Angeles; 'Fear and Trembling,' Terrorism in three religious traditions. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Sep. 1984) page 670 Cited from Mia Bloom; 'Dying to Kill; The Allure of Suicide terror'; Columbia University Press/ New York; 2007; PP: 9, 10.) Zealots and the Sicarii had designed their actions to deliberately provoke a massive uprising. 'Consecutive atrocities narrowed the prospects for a political, or mutually agreeable, solution serving to destroy the credibility of moderates on both sides while steadily expanding the conflict, which enlisted new participants.’ (David C. Rapoport, University of California, Los Angeles; 'Fear and Trembling,' Terrorism in three religious traditions. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Sep. 1984) page 672 Cited from Mia Bloom; 'Dying to Kill; The Allure of Suicide terror'; Columbia University Press/ New York; 2007; PP: 9, 10.) ‘Zealot leaders even burned the food supply of their own forces during Jerusalem's long siege as a show of religious dedication and in an attempt to force God's hand to act against the Romans. God would have no choice but to intervene to preserve his adherents. Divine intervention was not forthcoming and many of Jerusalem's residents starved to death. Josephus' position was that the Zealots' tactics were to blame for all the calamities that befell the Jewish people including their exile, expulsion, the massacres of Jewish communities in Egypt and Cyprus, and the destruction of the Second Temple. Finally, Josephus blamed the mass suicide at Masada on Zealot intransigence. When Roman general Flavius Silva decided to attack Masada at the end of 72 AD, there were 960 insurgents and refugees in the fortress including men, women, and children. Silva surrounded the mountain with the tenth Roman legion plus auxiliaries. Once the fortress' fall was inevitable the following year, Eleazar, the leader of the zealots, persuaded Masada's defenders to engage in an act of mass suicide. (Two women and their five children survived to describe the events by hiding in a cave.) The Zealots on Masada preferred to die by their own hand rather than be captured by their Roman enemies. (Josephus, The Jewish war, volume 7, 252 - 404; Paul Johnson, A history of the Jews -New York; Harper and Row, 1987- , 139-140; David Rapoport, personal correspondence with the author, April 8, 2004. – Cited from Mia Bloom; 'Dying to Kill; The Allure of Suicide terror'; Columbia University Press/ New York; 2007;P: 10, 11)

[xiii] for more on Indian cults see Lung, Haha and Christopher B. Prowant. Black Science: Ancient and Modern Techniques of Ninja Mind Manipulation. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press, 2001

[xiv] ‘"Assassin" (Hashishins) cult founded in Persia in 1090 by Hassan ibn Sabbah ("The old Man of the Mountain") . From his impregnable "Eagle's Nest" (Alamut) castle hidden in the mountains of Persia, Hassan loosed wave after wave of suicidal agents -spies and assassins - upon the world. Hassan’s assassin cult was the template for all secret societies, spy net works, and terrorist groups that followed - down to the present day. This was the original al Qaeda! In his time, Hassan used every conceivable tactic, torture, and tool, from magic to murder, hashish and harlots, to dazzle and dirk enemy and initiate alike into doing his bidding. For Hassan and his assassins, the end justified the means. The means are terror and treachery and the end was power. Master shape shifters, whenever expedient, the Assassins made unholy covenants with heathen Hindus and allied themselves with infidel Christian crusaders against their Muslim brethren. For Hassan, and the Assassin Grandmasters who continued his lethal legacy, Islam was but a convenient black curtain behind which to hide. Hassan's assassins ruled by subterfuge and slaughter for over two centuries, until invading Mongols broke the cult's back in Persia in 1273. … After the destruction of their Persian HQ, the Assassins continued to survive and thrive from India to Syria, spawning "spin-off" groups and imitators, some as far -flung as Europe.’(Dr. Haha Lung; Mind Control; The Ancient Art of Psychological Warfare'; Citadel Press Kensington; 2006; P:194)

[xv] ‘ by the 13 century, the word Assassin, in variant forms, had already passed into European usage in this general sense of hired professional murderer. The Florentine chronicler Giovanni Villani, who died in 1348, tells how the lord of Lucca sent 'his assassins' (i suoi assassini) to Pisa to kill a troublesome enemy there. Even earlier, Dante, in a passing reference in the 19th canto of the Inferno, speaks of 'the treacherous assassin' (lo perfido assassin); his fourteenth-century commentator Francesco da Buti, explaining a term which for some readers at the time may still have been strange and obscure, remarks: 'Assassino e' colui che uccide altrui per danari' - An assassin is one who kills others for money. Since then 'assassin' has become a common noun in most European languages. It means a murderer, more particularly one who kills by stealth or treachery, whose victim is a public figure and whose motive is fanaticism or greed. It was not always so. The word first appears in the chronicles of the Crusades, as the name of a strange group of Muslim sectaries in the Levant, led by a mysterious figure known as the Old Man of the Mountain, and abhorrent, by their beliefs and practices, to good Christians and Muslims alike. ... ‘ (Bernard Lewis; The Assassins; A Radical Sect in Islam; Poenix publication; 2003; P: 2)

‘Marco Polo, who passed through Persia in 1273. Speaking of the Assassins chief; Polo wrote: 'He had caused a certain valley between two mountains to be enclosed, and had turned it into a garden, the largest and most beautiful that ever was seen … flowing freely with wine and milk and honey and water; and numbers of ladies and the most beautiful damsels in the world, who could play on all manner of instruments and sung most sweetly, and danced in a manner that it was charming to behold, For the Old Man desired to make his people believe that this was actually Paradise .... So when the Old Man would have any Prince slain,' Polo continues, 'he would say to such a youth: Go thou and slay so and so; and when thou returnest, my Angels shall bear thee into Paradise. And Should' st thou die nevertheless even so, I will send my Angels to carry thee back into Paradise. ... ‘And in this manner the Old One got his people to murder any one whom he desired to get rid of. (Philip K. Hitti 'The Assassins,' in George Andrews and Simon Vinkenoog -eds.-, The Book of Grass: An Anthology on Indian Hemp -London: Peter Owen, 1967-) Cited from: Mia Bloom; 'Dying to Kill; The Allure of Suicide terror'; Columbia University Press/ New York; 2007; PP: 5, 6)

[xvi] ‘Over the years, the Order of Assassins had, at one time or another, made pacts and treaties with (or at least had been accused of making pacts with ) rival Muslims, opportunistic crusaders, and godless Mongols. … In 1174 Sinan leader of Aleppine Assassins proposed an alliance between Christian King Amalric I of Jerusalem and the Assassins against Nur ed - Din Muslim Egyptian ruler. The Assassins would provide intelligence on Nur ed-Din's forces , as well as Assassins sappers should Amalric need them. In addition, Sinan would train a select cadre of Amalric's own troops in the tactics and techniques of the Assassins. To sweeten the pot, Sinan hinted that his branch of the Assassins sect might convert to Christianity en masse. Knowing the Assassins were fierce and fearless fighters and had the best intelligence network in Syria, Amalric agreed to the alliance.’ (Dr. Haha Lung; Assassin; The deadly art of the cult of the Assassins; Citadel Press; 1997; PP: 37,40)

[xvii] ‘Hassan II removed Islamic ritual obligations from the Assassins sect, even to the point of permitting the consumption of alcohol’ (Dr. Haha Lung; Assassin; The deadly art of the cult of the Assassins; Citadel Press; 1997; P: 36)

[xviii] To know more about how this organisations are using these concepts and how far their interpretation is different with what Islam says you can see my speech on this issue ‘The Use of the Philosophy of Martyrdom within Religious Cults for Acts of Terrorism’ at: http://www.banisadr.info/LSpeech050507.htm

[xix] In Islam there is no profession as holly men or priests, instead those who are expert in the religion call themselves as ‘Olama’ (knowledgeable people) or ‘Fagieh’, those who know rules of conduct within Islam and can judge (Qadi).

[xx] Assassins broke few Islamic rules of conducts including not killing an un-combatant and unarmed old man, especially during pray time and in a Mosque that was considered as centaury as other places of worshiping; by killing of Ubbayd Allah al Khatib, a Qadi (Judge) of Isfahan, during the Friday prayers in the mosque of Hamadan. Also Qadi (Judge) of Nishapur who was murdered during the celebrations at the end of Ramadan. (Bernard Lewis; The Assassins; A Radical Sect in Islam; Poenix publication; 2003; P:57)

[xxi] This is why I totally disagree with those who call destructive cults NRM (New Religious Movement), in my view The main difference between two is that a destructive cult from beginning to end is leader based whereas in a religion or a faith, or even an ideology, though its followers might at first rely more on the teacher, ideologue or messenger of that faith, idea or religion, in the end they relate to ideas rather than leaders. For them the important factor that takes precedence over all else are ideas such as the uniqueness of God, the existence or non-existence of God, Resurrection, Socialism or Capitalism, believing in transmigration or metempsychosis, struggling for social justice and an egalitarian society. They have dogma, but their dogma is idea-based rather than leader-based. On the opposite, destructive cult’s dogma and their fundamental principles are leader based rather than idea based. They can change all their principles, ideas, and fundamentals but cannot change two, therefore the real principles that their followers have to adhere to, till death, are 1-survival of the cult and 2- loyalty and obedience toward the leader of the cult.

While destructive cults might have some similarities with idea based groupings, as indeed all existing phenomena have some similarities, though cults might be offshoot of an ideology or as matter of fact eventually change into a NRM, still as long as they have characteristics of destructive cults, in my view they should be called as such, and of course when they change, their categorization can change accordingly. In Farsi we say not any sphere shape object is an apple; flower of apple because it can change into apple is not apple and apple pie because it has been made or has ingredient of apple is not apple too.

[xxii] If you like to know more about my view toward Mind manipulation, you can look at my speech in INFORM’s seminar November 2009, at: http://www.banisadr.info/London2009.htm

[xxiii] Terrorist Organizations Are Cults’; Masoud Banisadr; Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2009, PP: PAGE 9

[xxiv] Dispatches; ‘Britain’s Islamic Republic’; Channel four TV of UK; first of March 2010.